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The Jurisdictional Question in Hobby Lobby
Erin Morrow Hawley
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. may well be the biggest case of the past
Term.' But by its own rules, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to decide
the case. An obscure statute, the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 (AIA), imposes a
pay-first requirement on federal tax challenges. The deeply held conventional
wisdom is that the AIA is a jurisdictional statute,' and there is a good argument
that the AIA applies to the contraception mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby. In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court held that
Congress's decision to label something a tax provides the best evidence as to
whether Congress intended the AIA to apply. The contraception mandate, 26
U.S.C. § 4 9 80D (2012), expressly refers to its employer assessment as a taxtwenty-four times. As a result, the Court's failure to address the AIA in Hobby
Lobby was a serious mistake.

-

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice
Roberts famously - or perhaps infamously, depending on your point of view
concluded that the enforcement provision for the individual healthcare
mandate, 26 U.S.C. § SoooA (2012), was a penalty for statutory purposes and
yet a tax for constitutionalpurposes.' This creative reasoning was occasioned by
the AIA, which prevents a taxpayer from bringing a preemptive challenge to a
federal tax. Because the government depends upon the prompt collection of tax
revenues, the ist Congress, and every Congress since, has enforced taxes "by
summary and stringent means." The AIA thus requires a taxpayer to pay the
disputed tax and exhaust an administrative appeal before raising a
constitutional or other challenge through a refund action.6

1.

No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014).

2.

See Erin Morrow Hawley, The Equitable Anti-Injunction Act, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
(forthcoming 2014) (collecting cases and scholarly commentary).

3.

1 3 2 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012).

4.

Id.

5.

State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 614 (1875); see also Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78,
8o (1881) (holding that "[t]he necessities of government, the nature of the duty to be
performed, and the customary usages of the people" mean that a "different procedure" is
necessary for enforcing taxes.).

6.

26 U.S.C.

§ 7421(a) (2012) ("[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.")
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The AIA received a lot of attention in NFIB. Four months before oral
argument, the Supreme Court appointed an amicus curiae to argue "in support
of the position that the [AIA] bars the . . . challenge [to] the minimum

coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act."' As the
Court explained, there was a "reasonable argument that the Anti-Injunction
Act deprived [the Court] of jurisdiction" to hear the case." The Court also
directed the parties to brief the issue, and it reserved a full day of oral argument
for the AIA question. Three different views of the AIA were presented. The
Federal Government argued that the AIA was jurisdictional but did not apply
because § 50ooA was a penalty rather than a tax.9 The States and NFIB argued
that the AIA was not jurisdictional, and since the Government had forfeited
any such defense, the Court did not need to address the AIA at all.10 The courtappointed amicus, Robert Long, argued that the AIA required the Court to
dismiss the case because the AIA was jurisdictional and § 50ooA was a tax, not
a penalty.
The Court seriously considered Robert Long's assessment. "Before turning
to the merits," the Court wrote, "we need to be sure we have the authority to do
so."" The AIA, the Court explained, "protects the Government's ability to
collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or

otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes." As a result, "taxes can ordinarily be
challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a refund." 4 Characterizing §
500oA as a tax would have created significant problems for the individual
mandate challenges: because the mandate did not become enforceable until
2014, no plaintiff had yet paid Treasury. 5 Consequently, the challenges were
not the sort of refund suit typically allowed under the AIA, but rather suits to
restrain collection under § 500oA - and thus potentially barred by the AIA.
The Court avoided this conclusion, but only by holding that § 500oA
imposes a penalty and not a tax- at least for statutory purposes. The "best
evidence" as to whether Congress intended the AIA to apply to the individual

11-398)

7.

2566
Ct.
S.
132
NFIB,
Order,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/1118nizr.pdf.

8.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582.

9.

Reply Brief for Petitioners (Anti-Injunction Act) at 2-4, NFIB, 132 S. Ct 2566 (No. 11-398);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 46-54, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).

10.

Reply Brief for Private Respondents on the Anti-Injunction Act at 3-10, NFIB, 132 S. Ct
2566 (No. 11-398); Reply Brief for State Respondents on the Anti-Injunction Act at 3-9,
NFIB, 1 3 2 S. Ct 2 5 66 (No. 11-398).

11.

(No.

NFIB, 1 3 2 S. Ct. at 2583-84.

12.

Id. (emphasis added).

13.

Id. at 2582.

14.

Id. (citing Enochs v. Williams Pacling & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1962)).

15.

Id.
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mandate, concluded the Court, is the "statutory text.,6 Because the AIA and
the Affordable Care Act "are creatures of Congress's own creation," the Court
wrote, the issue of how they relate is for Congress to determine.1 7 Congress's
choice "to describe the '[s]hared responsibility payment' imposed on those
who forgo health insurance not as a 'tax,' but as a 'penalty' was dispositive.
Therefore, according to the Court, the AIA did not apply to the suit.19
This brings us to the present conundrum: the Court's text-based reasoning
in NFIB raises a significant question as to whether the AIA applies to the
contraception mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby. Under NFIB, there is a
"reasonable argument" that the AIA should have deprived the Court "of
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the [contraception] mandate." 20 That
mandate requires employers of a certain size who offer health insurance to
provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptives." Employers who fail to
provide such coverage must pay $100 per employee per day.' The statute
provides: "There is hereby imposed a tax on any failure of a group health plan
to meet the requirements of chapter ioo (relating to group health plan
requirements)."

It continues, "The amount of the tax imposed . . . on any

failure shall be $1oo for each day in the noncompliance period with respect to
each individual to whom such failure relates."'
If the NFIB Court really meant what it said, then this statutory text should
have engendered some serious jurisdictional qualms for the Hobby Lobby Court.
The language of the mandate could not be clearer: the statute refers to the
contraception assessment as a "tax" no less than twenty-four times.25

16.

Id. at 2583.

17.

Id.

18.

Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 5oooA(b), (g)(2)).

19.

Id.; see also id. at 2656 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What qualifies as a tax for purposes of the
Anti-Injunction Act, unlilke what qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Constitution, is
entirely within the control of Congress.").

20.

Id. at 2583.

21.

See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727 (Feb.
iS, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. Pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 2590 & 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).

22.

26 U.S.C.

23.

26 U.S.C.

24.

25.

§§ 4980D(a)-(b)(l) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
§ 4980D(a) (2012) (emphasis added).

300gg-13 (2012).

Id. § 49 8oD(b) (emphasis added). The other penalty provision that may apply when
employers choose not to offer qualifying health insurance at all also refers to the payment as
an "assessable penalty" and as a "tax." Id. § 4980H(a). See Halbig v. Sebelils, No. 13-0623,
2014 WL 129023, at *9-11 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (finding that the penalty imposed by §
498oH is a tax subject to the AIA).
The Court has even applied the AIA to "statutorily described 'taxes"' where it thought the
label inaccurate. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (citing Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922) (noting
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Moreover, in holding that the individual mandate penalty in the ACA was not a
tax for the purposes of the AIA, the NFIB Court found it "significant" that the
"Affordable Care Act describes many other exactions it creates as 'taxes.' - 6
"Where Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute and different
language in another," the Court wrote, "it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally."' But surely the twenty-four instances of contrasting
language in § 4 9 80D suggest that Congress, here, too, should be presumed to
have acted intentionally. Finally, like any other tax, § 4 9 80D is located in the
Internal Revenue Code, enforced by the Internal Revenue Service, and
performs a revenue-raising function. 8
Indeed, at oral argument, the Justices repeatedly characterized § 4 9 80D as a
tax. As Justice Kagan put it, "[Section 4 9 80D]'s not even a penalty . .. in the
language of the statute. It's a payment or a tax."2 9 Justice Sotomayor similarly
observed, "It's not called a penalty. It's called a tax." 30 Invoking memories of
the NFIB decision (and audience laughter), the Chief Justice agreed: "She's
right about that."" In its decision, moreover, the Court casually referred to the
"taxes" imposed by the contraception mandate. Given the prevalence of such
sentiments among the Justices, one would expect a follow-up discussion about
the AIA-perhaps a question along the lines of, "So, counsel, if this payment is
a tax, then doesn't the AIA bar this lawsuit unless and until your clients have
paid the tax?" Yet not a single Justice raised the possibility of an AIA bar at oral
argument or in any opinion.

that the Anti-Injunction Act applied to the "Child Labor Tax" even though that "tax" had
been struck down as exceeding Congress's taxing power in Drexel Furniture)).
26.
27.

28.

Id.

Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 2; (198;)).
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 49 80D(a)-(b)(1) (2o2); id. § 6201 (Secretary may make "assessments of
all taxes" imposed by Tide 26); id. § 6301 (collection authority). In addition, the
Department of Health and Human Services may enforce regulations regarding health
insurance coverage when a state does not itself substantially enforce such provisions, 42
U.S.C. § 300gg 22 (2012), and the Secretary of Labor is authorized to enforce health-care
requirements with respect to ERISA employers. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (2012).

29.

Transcript of Oral Argument at
2014) (No. 13-354).

30.

Id. at 24; see also id. at 22 ("[I]sn't there another choice nobody talks about, which is paying
the tax[?]"); id. ("[E]mployers could choose not to give health insurance and pay . that
high of a tax"); id. at 26 ("So it's a tax.").

31.

Id. at 24.

32.

Hobby Lobby, slip op. at
affected employee").
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (U.S. June 30,

(noting that businesses could be "taxed $Ioo per day for each
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The Court's silence is puzzling given that Court precedent and academic
commentators have cast the AIA as jurisdictional." Granted, the AIA may not
satisfy the Court's recently created clear statement requirement for
jurisdictional provision-more about this later. Such a possibility, however,
does not explain the Supreme Court's failure to address the Act given that the
Court's most recent precedents on the AIA- and every court of appeals to
address the issue-label it jurisdictional. Where a requirement is jurisdictional,
waiver and forfeiture do not apply. Because a jurisdictional limitation goes to
the very power of the court to hear a case, a jurisdictional question must be
raised and decided sua sponte, even where all parties desire a decision on the
merits. 5 That's why the Court appointed an amicus to argue the jurisdictional
issue in NFIB. And that's why the Hobby Lobby Court's failure to address the
AIA question was a serious mistake.

33.

See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749 (1974) ("[T]he Court of Appeals did not err
in holding that [the AIA] deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive
relief petitioner sought."); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962)
("The object of [the AIA] is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to
entertain suits seeldng injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes."); see also
Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2o1 Term-Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126
HARV. L. REv. 1, 46 n.275 (2012) ("Had the [§ SoooA] payment been construed as a tax for
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court would have been deprived of jurisdiction,
and determination of the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision would have
had to await a suit after 2014 by an individual who made the payment and then sued for a
refund.") citing Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7)); Kevin C. Walsh, The Anti-Injunction Act,
Congressional Inactivity, and Pre-enforcement Challenges to 5 5 oooA of the Tax Code, 46 U.
RICH. L. REv. 823, 828 (2012) ("[tlhe AIA is jurisdictional"); Michael C. Dorf & Neil S.
Siegel, "Early-Bird Special" Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction Act Permits The Present
Challenges To the Minimum Coverage Provision, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389, 394 (2012)
(assuming the AIA is jurisdictional); Stewart Jay, On Slippery ConstitutionalSlopes and the
Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1133, 1184 (2012) (referring to the AIA as a
"jurisdictional statute[]"); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA
Litigation and the Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REv.
639, 653 n.62 (2012) (describing the "Anti-Injunction Act's jurisdictional bar"). For their
part, the federal courts are unanimous in the view that the AIA is jurisdictional. See, e.g.,
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F. 3 d 391, 401 ( 4 th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679
(2012); RYO Mach., LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 696 F- 3d 467, 470 (6th Cir. 2012);
Wade v. Reg'l Dir., 504 F. App'x 748, 752 (1oth Cir. 2012); Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F. 3 d 529, 539 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Pagonis v. United States, 575 F- 3 d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2009); Enax v.
United States, 243 F. App'x 449, 451 (tith Cir. 2007); Hansen v. Dep't of Treasury, 528 F-3d
597, 6oi ( 9 th Cir. 2007); Gardner v. U.S., 211 F. 3 d 1305, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Shrock v.
United States, 92 F. 3 d 1187 (7 th Cir. 1996); Int'l Lotto Fund v. Va. State Lottery Dep't, 20
F. 3 d 589, 591 ( 4 th Cir. 1994); Flynn v. United States by and through Eggers, 786 F.2d 586,
588 ( 3d Cir. 1986); Lane v. United States, 727 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1984); Laino v. United
States, 633 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir. 1980); Lange v. Phinney, 507 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir.

34.

1975); Williams v. Wiseman, 333 F.2d 81o, 811 (toth Cir. 1964).
Dolan v. United States, 56o U.S. 6o, 611 (2010).

35.

Arbaughv. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 & n.i (2006).
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In short, there is a good argument to be made that the AIA applies to the
challenges brought by Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby was seeking to enjoin the
collection of the contraception mandate payment. Section 4 9 80D expressly
(and repeatedly) imposes a "tax" on an employer's failure to provide
contraceptive coverage, and Congress's choice to call the assessment a "tax" is a
strong indication that the AIA applies. 6 In contrast to NFIB, where there may
have been "no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to 'any tax'
would apply to a penalty,""7 in Hobby Lobby there was every reason to think
that a statute applying to "any tax" would apply to a "tax."
Why was the Hobby Lobby Court unconcerned about the AIA? Did the same
Court that directed briefing on, and reserved an entire day of oral argument
for, the AIA question in NFIB simply overlook the jurisdictional issue lurking
in Hobby Lobby? Given that NFIB was decided merely two years ago (and was
hardly a minor case), this seems unlikely. The possibility also seems remote
given that, in his concurrence to the Tenth Circuit's Hobby Lobby opinion,
Judge Gorsuch concluded that there was "a non-trivial argument" that the AIA
applied to the contraception mandate."'
Perhaps the Supreme Court said nothing about the AIA because it agreed
with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the AIA does not apply to regulatory
taxes.39 While the Court once contemplated a revenue-raising/regulatory
distinction,4 o however, that line of argument has not been viable since the
1930s." As the Court stated in NFIB, "taxes that seek to influence conduct are
nothing new."' Congress has long enforced its regulatory purposes through
the tax code-indeed, one scholar estimates that over half of the IRS's

NFIB, 13 2 S. Ct. at 2582.

37.

Id. at 2583.

38.

See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114, 1157 (1oth Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 1126-28 (majority opinion; noting the possibility that the AIA
applied)

39.

See id.

40.

Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer,
Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922).

41.

See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 743 (1974) (citing Miller v. Standard Nut
Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932) and Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S.
439 (1938)). In Korte v. Sebelius, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the AIA did not bar a
challenge to the contraception mandate because plaintiffs were seeldng to void the mandate,
not the resulting taxes. 735 F- 3 d 654, 669-70 ( 7 th Cir. 2013). But as the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged, the effect of a successful suit would be to restrain the collection of what
Congress had labeled a tax, and even the Seventh Circuit went on to analyze whether
Congress meant the AIA to apply to the mandate. Id.

42.

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

.

36.

68
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13 2 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

U.S. 557 (1922); Regal Drug
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resources are devoted to non-revenue raising measures. Furthermore, the
individual mandate provision at issue in NFIB was no less "regulatory" than
the contraception mandate, and yet the Court suggested that Congress's
decision to label that assessment a "tax" was dispositive for AIA purposes." If
the Court wanted to revive a regulatory-purposes exception to the AIA, it is
difficult to imagine unanimous agreement on the issue; at the very least, the
Court likely would request briefing on the question.
The Court's silence on the jurisdictional question is especially puzzling in
light of a different case argued the same day as Hobby Lobby -and just a few
blocks away. In Halbig v. Burwell, the government argued that the AIA divested
the district court of jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims that the Affordable Care
Act does not offer tax credits to individuals who purchase insurance through
federal exchanges.4 s According to the government, § 4 9 80H, which fines large
employers that fail to provide adequate coverage, was a "tax" within the
meaning of the AIA.4. The government's briefing maintained that the
reasoning in NFIB was controlling: "[T]he express characterization of
Section 4 9 80H as a 'tax' leaves no doubt that the Anti-Injunction Act precludes
the employer plaintiffs' claims here."*8 The District Court for the District of
Columbia agreed. Judge Freidman concluded that "for purposes of the AntiInjunction Act the assessable payment described in 26 U.S.C. § 4 9 80H must be
considered a tax." 49 His conclusion was compelled by NFIB, which "held that
the label that Congress gives an assessment collected by the IRS matters for
purposes of the AIA."so

43.

Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DuKE L.J. 1717, 1749 (2014).
Because "[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory," the Court has "upheld such obviously
regulatory measures as taxes on selling marijuana and sawed-off shotguns" under the taxing
power. NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

44.

NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 ("It is up to Congress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to
any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Congress's choice of label on that
question.").

45.

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 35,
Halbig v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 129023 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (No. 13-0623).

46.

Id.

47.

Id. at 35-36.

48.

Id. at 36-37.

49.

Halbig v. Sebelius, No.

5o.

Id. at 9; see also id. at to ("The Section 498oH assessment acts like a tax and looks like a tax
[therefore] it is a [tax]."). On appeal, the Government continued to press its argument that
the AIA required the employer-plaintiffs to violate Section 498oH, pay the tax, and then sue
for a refund. Brief for the Appellees at 55-56, Halbig v. Burwell, 2014 WL 3569745, at *II.
The D.C. Circuit avoided the question by holding that, because at least one individual
plaintiff possessed standing, there was no need to consider standing as to the employerplaintiffs. Halbig v. Burwell, 2014 WL 3579745 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2014). The AIA did not
apply to individual plaintiffs because they were challenging the individual mandate, which

3

, 201 4 WL 12 9 023 , at

*ii (D.D.C. Jan.

15, 2014).

.

13 -062

69

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM

September 6, 2014

There is no reason why the same analysis should not have applied to the
contraception mandate in Hobby Lobby. In a footnote in its Halbig briefing, the
Government sought to distinguish § 4 9 80H from § 4 9 80D (the provision at
issue in Hobby Lobby) on the grounds that the latter provision triggers non-tax
consequences. In contrast to § 4 9 8oH, the Government argued, the tax
imposed by § 4 9 80D "is just one of the many collateral consequences that can
result from a failure to comply with the contraceptive-coverage requirement."s
But there is no "collateral consequences" exception to the AIA-at least not one
previously endorsed by the Supreme Court. 2 The Government's
contemporaneous claim that the AIA is jurisdictional highlights the Court's
failure to consider whether the AIA applied in Hobby Lobby.
One explanation for the Court's reticence may be the harsh consequences of
applying a jurisdictional AIA. In fact, Hobby Lobby exemplifies several problems
with the conventional view of the AIA as jurisdictional. If the contraception
assessment is a tax, then Hobby Lobby's case may not go forward. In order to
raise their religious liberty claims, the company must wait for the regulation to
go into effect, pay the tax ($1.3 million a day), and file a refund action. This is
in stark contrast to the rule that, subject to justiciability concerns, preenforcement review of substantial monetary penalties is ordinarily available. 3
For some plaintiffs, the difficult choice between paying a large tax and
exercising conscience rights may not be economically viable. More importantly,
even if Hobby Lobby were ultimately to prevail in their refund suit, a refund
remedy is generally considered insufficient to compensate a plaintiff for the
loss of a civil or political right.5' As the D.C. Circuit put it in Halbig, a tax
refund suit offers only "'doubtful and limited relief'"-it is an often an
inadequate remedy compared to ordinary judicial review with the possibility of
prospective relief'55
Another possible explanation is that the Supreme Court's jurisdictional
faux pas was not really an error. There is a good argument that the

the Supreme Court had concluded was not subject to the AIA in NFIB. Halbig, 2014 WL
129023, at *8 n.8.

51.

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgement Motion at 23 n.io, Halbig v. Sebelius, No.

52.

13-0623 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114,
1127 (1oth Cir. 2013)).
Hawley, supra note 2 (describing exceptions to the ALA).

53.

DOUGLAs LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 41 (1991).

54.

Id.

55.

Halbig, 2014 WL 3569745, at *6 (quoting Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F-3 d 519 (D.C. Cir.
(under APA).

Cf Bowen,

487 U.S.

at 904-05

(rejecting

2009))

as "unprecedented"

the

government's argument that a suit for monetary damages is an adequate alternative to

prospective relief under the APA).
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conventional view of the AIA as jurisdictional is wrong.s6 As I have argued
elsewhere, the view that the AIA is jurisdictional is based upon an overbroad
understanding of what counts as jurisdictionalr -one from which the Court
has recently backed away, 8 indicating that jurisdictional holdings must be
reevaluated.59 The Court has directed courts to return to text, structure, and
context to determine whether a provision is in fact jurisdictional,6 o and to use a
demanding test: a provision may only be considered jurisdictional if Congress
"clearly" says so.6' A reexamination of the text, structure, and context of the
AIA reveals that the statute is not jurisdictional.2 On this reading, the
Government's failure to press the AIA defense would have permitted Hobby
Lobby's suit to go forward. Even so, the Court's most recent precedents label
the AIA jurisdictional 6 ' and the Government continues to argue that the AIA is
a jurisdictional statute.6' These factors and the Supreme Court's decision in
NFIB should have required an analysis into whether Hobby Lobby's lawsuit
was barred by the AIA.
We may never be certain why the Court expressed so much concern over
the AIA in NFIB and none in Hobby Lobby. Could it be that issues of religious
conscience have a special salience? Are passive virtues more important in cases
involving congressional power than those involving individual rights? Did the
Court's view of Hobby Lobby as presenting two conflicting statutes (RFRA and
the ACA) push the AIA- yet a third statute- into the background? If so, did
RFRA not only trump the substantive provisions of the ACA but also the
procedural ones of the AIA? All of these are promising avenues for future
research, but the Court's treatment of Hobby Lobby itself yields few clues. Given
the contentious nature of the case, one would expect a dissenting Justice at
least to raise the AIA issue. Under current precedent, after all, there is a good

56.

See Hawley, supra note

57.

See id.

58.

See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006).

59. Id. at

2.

515; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) ("[D]rive-by

6o.

rulings . have no precedential effect.").
See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817,
1 3 2 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012).

61.

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.

62.

Hawley, supra note 2. Indeed, a reexamination of the text, structure, and context (which
includes precedent and history) of the AIA reveals not only that the AIA is not jurisdictional
in the usual sense, but also that it was meant to govern the equity jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Id. Equity jurisdiction functions much differently than traditional jurisdiction
lawsuits may go forward where the Government waives of forfeits a defense and in certain
extraordinary circumstances. Id.

63.

See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).

jurisdictional

24 (2013); Gonzalez v. Thaler,

-

8

725,

736 (1974); Enoch v. Williams Packing & Nay.

64. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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argument that the Court reached out to decide a highly politicized case in
which it had no jurisdiction. Then again, maybe the dissenting Justices - all
usually chary of provisions that strip jurisdiction from the federal courts -were
playing the long game and thus were unwilling to suggest that the AIA is in
fact jurisdictional. Only time will tell.
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